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Abstract
Westudy repeatedwater allocationdecisions among small scale irrigationusers inTanzania.
In a treatment replicating water scarcity conditions, convexities in production make that
substantial efﬁciency gains can be obtained by deviating from equal sharing, leading to an
equity–efﬁciency trade-off. In a repeated game setting, it becomes possible to reconcile
efﬁciency with equity by rotating the person who receives the largest share, but such a
strategy requires a longer run perspective. Correlating experimental data from an irrigation
game with individual time preference data, we ﬁnd that less patient irrigators are less likely
to use a rotation strategy.
I. Introduction
Livelihood systems that rely on a common pool resource are often confronted with an
equity–efﬁciency trade-off. For instance, in a setting characterized by a scarce common
resource that serves as an input into a convex production function, the optimal outcome
in terms of aggregate production may be to allocate all resources to a single individual.
Without any formof ex-post redistribution, such an allocationmay conﬂictwith local equity
norms, which tend to be particularly strong in small-scale societies. The convexities in the
production function means that distributing the common resource more equally between
all users leads to signiﬁcant aggregate welfare losses.
However, in a dynamic context, where the common pool resource has to be allocated
repeatedly, it may become possible to reconcile efﬁciency with equity. If agents consider
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utility overmore than one period, a rotation strategywhere one individual takes all resources
in one round and another person takes all in the following period may become a preferred
strategy. In fact, for strictly convex production functions, any deviation from equal sharing,
followed by an equal deviation in the other direction will improve aggregate utility, without
jeopardizing equality.
Repeated interactions introduce an element of timing, such that individuals do not
only consider instantaneous utility, but a stream of future utility, appropriately discounted.
Individual time preferences will therefore inﬂuence what equilibrium prevails. Rotation
will only be an optimal strategy if players sufﬁciently value the utility derived from future
payoffs. In otherwords, the optimal solution in terms of both equity and aggregate efﬁciency
will only come about when agents are patient enough.
In this article,we test if patience is indeed aprerequisite for equity–efﬁciencyoptimizing
distribution behaviourwhen agents have social preferences and rely on a convex production
technology.We start by presenting a simple two period model where one player decides on
the distribution of a single production input between himself and another producer. With
convex production technology, our model predicts that taking everything in one round and
taking nothing in the following round is optimal if the player that makes the decisions
becomes more patient. To test our model, we run a ﬁeld lab experiment amongst traditional
small-scale irrigation users in the Southern Highlands ofTanzania.The data on distribution
behaviour is then correlated with a measure of time preference, which we obtained from
a standard time preference elicitation experiment. We ﬁnd a remarkable tendency to share
equally (D’Exelle, Lecoutere and Van Campenhout, 2012a). From a dynamic perspective,
we ﬁnd thatmany players rotate, and thatmore impatient irrigation users rotate signiﬁcantly
less.
This article is related to several other articles. First of all, it builds on the growing evi-
dence that people not only care about their own income, but also about how it compareswith
the income of others (see Camerer, 2003 for an overview in a behavioural economics con-
text). New utility models have been elaborated that account for social preferences through
inequality aversion (e.g. Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000). While
most evidence on inequality aversion comes from experiments with university students
(Camerer and Thaler, 1995), this aversion seems to be particularly large in small-scale,
close-knit societies (see e.g. Henrich et al., 2001).
The importance of impatience has been noted in the theoretical bargaining literature.
In bilateral bargaining, if agents are identical and make alternating offers, equilibrium
distributions approach equality as impatience diminishes (Rubinstein, 1982). Experiments
that test thesemodels ﬁnd some support, but also note a countervailing tendency that favours
fair outcomes (Binmore, Swierzbinski andTomlinson, 2007). In ourmodel, only one player
can decide on the distribution, but the fact that this player has social preferences makes
our model reminiscent of such bargaining games. As such, this article also contributes to
the large literature that empirically investigates multi-period non-cooperative interactions,
while avoiding the main criticism on this literature that agents do not behave in the rational
and selﬁsh way these models assume (Binmore, Shaked and Sutton, 1985;Weg and Zwick,
1999; Camerer, 2003).
This article is also an extension to D’Exelle et al. (2012a). In that article, we provide a
detailed account of the irrigation experiment and describe how small scale irrigation users
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deal with equity efﬁciency trade-offs. We ﬁnd that equal sharing is most common, even
in the scarcity treatment where this strategy comes at a substantial cost. Selﬁsh deviations
are frowned upon by downstream users, but we also observe that a signiﬁcant number of
them appear satisﬁed when they receive nothing in the scarcity treatment. The likelihood
that upstream users alternate between altruistic and selﬁsh deviations increases in the
scarcity treatment, suggesting the existence of rotation as a welfare-enhancing institution
that respects local egalitarian norms. This article focusses on rotation an instrument for
efﬁcient and equitable redistribution. It theoretically shows that, under certain conditions,
present bias can undermine this type of behaviour. The theory is then tested by combining
data from the irrigation experiment with a measure of individual time preference.
The remainder of this article is organized as follows. Section II presents an economic
model that describes optimal behaviour of agents that care about inequality and rely on
a common resource as input in a convex production process. Section III describes the
experimental setup. Sections IV and IV look at the equilibria and give some descriptive
statistics. Section VI presents the econometric model and results for the analysis of the
repeated game. Section VII concludes and looks at lessons that can be drawn from the
results of this study.
II. A simple model of equity–efﬁciency optimizing distribution
In this section, we will present a stylized model of an asymmetric common pool prob-
lem where one agent decides how a resource is divided. A dictator game is assumed to
be played repeatedly and to happen in a context where social norms force the dictator
to be other-regarding. To aid interpretation, we could think of the model as describing
an irrigation system where two agents, denote by superscripts (i=U for upstream user
and D for downstream user) are positioned along the irrigation channel. In the model,
the upstream user has full control over a ﬁxed ﬂow of water and has to decide on how
much of this resource to keep for him/herself. The residual is then assumed to go to the
downstream user. While irrigation systems are a classic example of dilemmas involving
asymmetric relationships, more subtle asymmetries among appropriators in their ability to
access common resources are widespread. Such asymmetries might be the consequence
of geography, social hierarchy, skills, knowledge and other attributes of the action arena
(Janssen and Rollins, 2012). The theory presented in this study is also applicable to such
dilemmas.
The model has three key features. First, we assume the upstream user is inequality
averse. Second, both agents have convex production technology.Third, agents have limited
foresight (up to a maximum of two periods). Social preferences are modelled with a Fehr–
Schmidt utility function (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999). In the two agent case of one upstream
and one downstream user, utility of the upstream user is determined as:
U (yU ) = yU −U ·max{yD − yU , 0}−U ·max{yU − yD, 0}, (1)
with yU and yD being the income received by the upstream and downstream irrigator, U
the envy parameter and U the guilt parameter. The envy and guilt parameters determine
the utility loss due to disadvantageous and advantageous inequality aversion, respectively.
It is commonly assumed people feel more envy than guilt, so that   and 0 < 1.
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Furthermore, as in our distributiongameonly theupstreamuser takes distributiondecisions,
only his/her utility function is relevant in our problem. This means that the upstream user
will distribute water access in such a way that the downstream user has an equal or lower
ﬁnal income than the upstream user, that is, yD yU , such that equation (1) reduces to:
U (yU ) = yU −U · (yU − yD). (2)
We assume both agents use a common resource as an input in their production functions
f (), which produces an income y. Both players have the same production function.We will
assume convex production technology y= f (w), with f ′ >0 and f ′′ >0.
Finally, we also assume that agents have limited foresight (up to a maximum of two
time periods), so that the upstream user maximizes utility over two rounds. Denoting U
as the discount rate of the upstream user, we deﬁne inter-temporal utility derived from an
income stream for the upstream user over two periods as:
U (yU )=U (yU1 , yU2 )=U
(
yU1 +
yU2
1+U
)
=U
(
f (wU1 )+
f (wU2 )
1+U
)
. (3)
If we assume the utility function is additive and homothetic of degree one, we can substitute
equation (2) into equation (3) to arrive at the objective function of the upstream user’s
problem:
U (wU1 ,w
U
2 ) = f (wU1 )+
f (wU2 )
(1+U ) −
U
(
f (wU1 )+
f (wU2 )
(1+U )
−
(
f (W −wU1 )+
f (W −wU2 )
(1+U )
))
,
(4)
which is to be maximized with respect to wU1 and w
U
2 subject to the following inequality
constraints:
wU1 W , (5)
wU2 W , (6)
f (wU1 )+
f (wU2 )
(1+U ) −
(
f (W −wU1 )+
f (W −wU2 )
(1+U )
)
 0, (7)
where the last inequality comes from the assumption that , which in turn means that
yU − yD0, but applied to our two period model.
The Kuhn–Tucker conditions associated to problem (4) subject to the three inequality
constraints are the following:
f ′(wU1 )−U (f ′(wU1 )+ f ′(W −wU1 ))−1 +3(f ′(wU1 )+ f ′(W −wU1 ))=0, (8)
f ′(wU2 )
(1+U ) −
U
(
f ′(wU2 )
(1+U ) +
f ′(W −wU2 )
(1+U )
)
−2 +3
(
f ′(wU2 )
(1+U ) +
f ′(W −wU2 )
(1+U )
)
= 0, (9)
wU1 W ,10, (wU1 −W )1 =0, (10)
wU2 W ,20, (wU2 −W )2 =0, (11)
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f (wU1 )+
f (wU2 )
(1+U ) −
(
f (W −wU1 )+
f (W −wU2 )
(1+U )
)
 0, 30,
(
f (wU1 )+
f (wU2 )
(1+U ) −
(
f (W −wU1 )+
f (W −wU2 )
(1+U )
))
3 =0. (12)
However, as equation (4) is convex, the internal solution to this problem is a minimum.
Therefore, we conﬁne attention to ﬁnding solutions on the constraints. We start by investi-
gating the last constraint [equation (12)] and solve recursively. We distinguish two cases:
one where the upstream user keeps the entire resource in the ﬁrst period and one where
he/she keeps the entire resource in the second period.
Case 1. wU2 =W .
If we assume that condition (12) holds with equality and the upstream user keeps the
entire resource in the second period [wU2 =W , equation (11)], we get:
f (wU1 )− f (W −wU1 )=
(f (0)− f (W ))
(1+U ) . (13)
This result tells us that if the upstream user is bound by condition (7), guilt feelings do
not play a role in distributing the resource in the ﬁrst period. This is because if equation
(7) holds with equality, this imposes that total resources appropriated by the upstream
user over the two rounds should equal total resources left for the receiving player over
both rounds. More interestingly, the upstream user’s time preference does inﬂuence the
distribution of W in the ﬁrst period. In general, the optimal strategy of the upstream user
is to appropriate a smaller share of the resource if he/she becomes more patient. As we
started out by assuming that the upstream user appropriates the entire resource in the
second period, this means rotating becomes the preferred option if patience increases. In
the extreme case when U = 0, we ﬁnd that the optimal amount of the resource agent U
would appropriate in the ﬁrst period is zero, meaning full rotation. On the other hand, if
the upstream user is impatient, he or she will want his or her share as quickly as possible.
In the limit of U →∞, the upstream user will appropriate half of the available resource
in the ﬁrst period. This is so because equation (12) reduces to f (wU1 )= f (W −wU1 ), which
will only be the case if wU1 = W2 .
Case 2. wU1 =W .
If equation (7) holds with equality, but now we assume that the upstream user takes all
resources in the ﬁrst period, wU1 =W , we get that:
f (W )− f (0)= (f (W −w
U
2 )− f (wU2 ))
(1+U ) . (14)
Again, guilt feelings do not enter the equation determining optimal resource appropriation
by the upstream user in the second period, but his/her time preference does. The only
reasonable solution [0wU2 W , 0wU1 W , f (0)< f (W )] is when U = 0. If this is
the case, we ﬁnd that it is optimal for the downstream user to take nothing in the second
period (wU2 =0), which means perfect rotation. This is because, we are moving along the
constraint that requires the resource to be shared equally [equation (7) holds with equality].
© 2014 The Authors. Oxford Bulletin of Economics and Statistics published by Oxford University and John Wiley & Sons Ltd.
Equity–efﬁciency optimizing resource allocation 239
In addition, we assume that the upstream user already appropriated the maximum [by also
making equation (10) a binding constraint] in the ﬁrst round. The only situation in which
both these constraints can be binding is when future income is valued equally to current
income and everything is left to the downstream user.
The above two equations [equation (13) and (14)] that express the upstream user’s
appropriation in both periods in terms of impatience are central to our empirical model.
There is, however, a second parameter that determines rotation: the guilt parameter.Wewill
not provide a derivation for the equilibrium conditions (our objective function is convex,
so ﬁrst order conditions will lead us to a local minimum anyway). Instead, we look at the
change in utility from a change in the guilt parameter when we move along the wU1 =W
and the wU2 =W boundaries:
If wU1 =W , we get:
U (wU2 )= f (W )+
f (wU2 )
(1+U ) −
U
(
f (W )+ f (w
U
2 )
(1+U ) −
(
f (0)+ f (W −w
U
2 )
(1+U )
))
, (15)
@U
@U
=−f (W )− f (w
U
2 )
(1+U ) +
(
f (0)+ f (W −w
U
2 )
(1+U )
)
, (16)
@U
@U
= f (0)− f (W )+ (f (W −w
U
2 )− f (wU2 ))
(1+U ) . (17)
So, if the upstream user appropriates the entire resource in the ﬁrst period, the utility
he or she derives from appropriating resources in the second period is inversely related
to his or her guilt feelings. Obviously, in the extreme case where U →∞, the change
in utility associated with a change in guilt is independent of the resources appropriated
in the second period, and f (0)− f (W ) 0, as f ′ > 0. If U becomes smaller, there is an
additional negative effect if the upstream user also decides to appropriate more water than
the equal split in the second period.
If wU2 =W , we get:
U (wU1 ) = f (wU1 )+
f (W )
(1+U ) −
U
(
f (wU1 )+
f (W )
(1+U ) −
(
f (W −wU1 )+
f (0)
(1+U )
))
, (18)
@U
@U
=−f (wU1 )−
f (W )
(1+U ) +
(
f (W −wU1 )+
f (0)
(1+U )
)
, (19)
@U
@U
= f (W −wU1 )− f (wU1 )+
(f (0)− f (W ))
(1+U ) . (20)
This result indicates that if the upstream user takes all of the resource in the second period,
the utility derived from the resource appropriated in the ﬁrst period is inversely related
to the guilt parameter if the upstream user appropriates more than half of the resource,
irrespective of the value of the discount rate. If the discount rate reduces, an additional
negative effect, independent of the amount appropriated in the ﬁrst round, is added.
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III. Experimental setup
To assess the importance of time preference for equity–efﬁciency optimizing behaviour, we
combine data from two different ﬁeld experiments. One is a distribution game that mimics
features of an irrigation system. The second is an experiment to elicit time preferences of
the players. In this section, we describe both experiments in turn.
The irrigation experiment
The distribution game was framed as a series of interactions between two irrigation users.
One player, a (randomly assigned) upstream user, was instructed to decide on the division
of a constant stream of irrigation water (12 hours of water per round) between him/her
and a downstream user that was randomly paired to the upstream user. The players’ roles
remained ﬁxed throughout the entire game and the paired upstream and downstream users
did not know each other’s identity.After the upstream user made the decision on howmuch
of the total available hours of water to keep for own production and how much was left
for the downstream user, the latter could react to the former’s decision. The downstream
user was given four different options to react: express satisfaction, remain silent, express
disagreement and punish the downstream user. From these options, only the last one in-
volved real costs for both parties. Because direct punishment would be too intrusive, this
option was framed as if a mediator was brought in at the cost of the downstream user (30
Tanzanian Shilling (TSH), one dollar was about 1200 TSH at the time of the experiment.)
who ﬁnes the upstream user by reducing the payoff of the upstream user by 100 TSH.
For each player, the irrigation water input was directly related to cash income through a
production function that was the same for each player. As irrigation-dependent production
requires a critical water input, these production functionswere characterized by a threshold.
The threshold represented a minimum water level below which production was equal to
a low level, irrespective of the exact water input. In addition, above this critical water
input, production showed decreasing marginal returns. This was the baseline treatment,
which could be interpreted as a situation of water abundance. The production function was
such that there was no conﬂict between equity and efﬁciency. Total water availability was
sufﬁcient for both water users to reach the minimum water input, and aggregate income
was highest at the equal split.
We also introduced a scarcity treatment. During the course of the game, we changed the
production function as to simulate a general drop in water availability. More speciﬁcally,
after ﬁve rounds of using the production functions of the baseline abundance treatment, we
introduced a new production function with the property that equal sharing now conﬂicts
with efﬁciency. In all subsequent rounds, total water availability was insufﬁcient for both
users to reach the threshold and aggregate revenue is maximal when the upstream user
takes all the water (or leaves all water to the downstream user).1 This treatment was played
for ten rounds. The production functions are represented in Table 1.
1
While the theoretical model assumes a twice differentiable convex production function, we used a production
function that features a threshold in the experiment for practical reasons. This does not affect the main result, as the
main property that f (tx1 + (1− t)x2) < tf (x1)+ (1− t)f (x2) for t ∈ [0, 1] also holds for our production function, at
least over a certain domain. In other words, the function is also convex over the domain used in the experiment.
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TABLE 1
Production function
Treatment 1 Treatment 2
Hours
upstream user Upstream Downstream Upstream Downstream
0 50 500 50 350
1 50 500 50 325
2 50 475 50 300
3 50 450 50 250
4 175 425 50 200
5 250 375 50 125
6 325 325 50 50
7 375 250 125 50
8 425 175 200 50
9 450 50 250 50
10 475 50 300 50
11 500 50 325 50
12 500 50 350 50
Irrigated agricultural production is likely to provide the convexity in the production
function that is key to our theoretical model. A production function featuring threshold
effects may indeed be most appropriate to describe production within an irrigation scheme
whenwater is scarce. Plant physiology is such that aminimum amount ofwater is necessary
to obtain yields (Aiken and Lamm, 2011). In the irrigation sites under study, we found that
the bulk of the sites are planted with maize (42%) and beans (30%). The remainder of the
area is planted with tomatoes, Chinese cabbage and other vegetables.All these plants need
an absolute minimum amount of water to grow and produce crops or fruits. Both maize
and tomatoes need at least 400 mm of water to grow, while beans need only slightly more
(Onwueme and Sinha, 1991). If irrigation is below this level, plants will shrivel and can
only be used as animal fodder or organic fertilizer.
We organized 13 different sessions of the experiment with 156 users, randomly sam-
pled from ﬁve traditional self-governed irrigation systems in the Muﬁndi district, which
is located in the Southern Highlands of Tanzania. Per session, the minimum number of
participants was eight and the maximum was 14.All participants played the full 15 rounds
and did not know beforehand on how many rounds would be played.2 They also did not
2
Participants were paid out at the end of the game. One may argue that this does not sufﬁciently reﬂect reality,
where each farmer gets the return on water investment immediately after each harvest. In addition, it makes it less
obvious that impatience is playing a role in rotating behaviour. There are different reasons why we decided to pay
participants at the end of the game.Apart from the practical problems in paying out each participant after each round,
we doubt that paying after each round would have enabled us to better capture the effect of time preference on rotation
within the game. The time difference between the different rounds of the game would simply be too short to generate
a detectable effect. More fundamentally, we believe that what is driving human behaviour is present bias, of which
the impatience as we measure it is only one manifestation. In other words, the fact that the individual wants to have
something now rather than at some point in the future is not what we are interested in per se, we only use it as a proxy
for a broader present bias because it is relatively easy to elicit through a standard behavioural experiment. We feel
that the failure to consider future actions as part of the strategy space is the main reason why people fail to rotate.
The approach we therefore took is the one suggested by Cardenas and Ostrom (2004) to take the experiment to the
ﬁeld and try enriching the analysis with important but difﬁcult issues as social context and personal identity. Each
round was framed as a season, and decisions had to be made on the distribution of water, a common input on the
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know that a second treatment would be introduced after the ﬁfth round. The experiment
was carefully designed and tested to make sure that illiterate people also understood the
instructions. Several questions were included in the design stage, and the experiment was
taken back to the drawing table until wewere conﬁdent that all participants fully understood
the consequences of all decisions and the actions that were available to them. A detailed
description of this experiment, together with a description and analysis of upstream and
downstream user behaviour can be found in to D’Exelle et al. (2012a).
The experiment was designed after careful study of existing irrigation systems in the
area. Local resource governance institutions, including those for governing irrigationwater,
are a blend of formal and informal rules and practices. They are shaped by pragmatism
and by people’s practices and have a high degree of local speciﬁcity (Leach, Mearns and
Scoones, 1999; Lecoutere 2011). Water distribution is often organized in such a way that
competition is limited and every communitymember can get an ‘equal’share conditional on
contributing to water provision activities like canal cleaning. Some form of rotation is often
a solution to ensure everyone gets her share of irrigation water (Ostrom, 1990; Potkansky
and Adams, 1998; Bruns and Meinzen-Dick, 2005; Lecoutere, 2011). But rotation is not
always strictly regulated or enforced.
The irrigation schemes from which the participants were sampled consist of networks
of locally dug river diversions and canals. Rudimentary technology is used to manage the
ﬂow of water. The irrigation schemes comprise of a patchwork of plots, most of which
are relatively small. From pre-experiment focus group discussions, we learned that water
governance is driven by avoidance of competition and distributive conﬂicts in order to
maintain harmony in the community. It is inspired by strong beliefs that everybody has a
right to water. A fair distribution of irrigation water is regarded essential. Some irrigators
believed this share should be proportional to the size and condition of the plot and to the
crops’water needs. Some irrigators referred to water sharing schemes allotting equal time
slots for water use; others believed it depends more on the goodwill of your upstream user
rather than on strict regulation.
In practice, an irrigator in the schemes takes a share of irrigationwater on a regular basis
by diverting the ﬂow to his or her ﬁeld(s) during a certain time after which the ﬂow can
continue to the downstream user(s). The downstream user is not a passive receiver. In some
cases, people opt to disregard infringements on their water share. In other cases, people
complain to the offender. Sometimes people call for punishment, especially for serious
or recurrent deﬁance of sharing rules. This often involves mediators, village leaders or
ofﬁcials and mostly implies a cost for the complainant, like the payment of transport
or ‘facilitation’ fee. The offender may have to pay a ﬁne or compensation. In case of
severe or recurrent rule breaking, s/he may be barred from accessing land or irrigation
water.
Measuring impatience
Within the experimental economics literature, the most common approach to measure
impatience is by presenting an individual with a list of pair-wise options. Each pair of
irrigated plot. Such framed experiments are common in situations where the researcher wants subjects to apply the
relevant ﬁeld heuristic when completing a task (Harrison and List, 2004).
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TABLE 2
Options used in the time elicitation exercise
Sequence of prior Option A Option B
Choice options chosen (after 1 month) (after 3 months)
1 1,000 TSH 1,500 TSH
2 A 1,000 TSH 1,750 TSH
2 B 1,000 TSH 1,250 TSH
3 AA 1,000 TSH 1,900 TSH
3 AB 1,000 TSH 1,600 TSH
3 BA 1,000 TSH 1,400 TSH
3 BB 1,000 TSH 1,100 TSH
TABLE 3
Intervals of discount rates
Sequence of Discount
Category options chosen rate (%)
1 BBB <4.45
2 BBA 4.45%–9.54
3 BAB 9.54%–13.39
4 BAA 13.39%–15.47
5 ABB 15.47%–17.26
6 ABA 17.26%–19.52
7 AAB 19.52%–21.40
8 AAA >21.40
options would typically consist of the option to receive an amount of X now and an option
to receive X + e at some ﬁxed date in the future, with e0, and going up as one proceeds
down the list. When e = 0, it is expected that the individual takes the money now, as
there is no return to waiting. However, as e increases, one would expect more people to
take the future income option. The point at which an individual switches from taking the
current option to taking the future option provides a bound on his discount rate (Coller and
Williams, 1999; Harrison, Lau and Williams, 2002).
Upon testing this experiment in the ﬁeld, we found that presenting illiterate farmerswith
such a list of optionswas problematic.This issue of visual overload has been encountered in
other studies that tried to elicit time preferences inAfrica (Holden, Shiferaw andWik, 1998;
Klemick andYesuf, 2008; Bauer and Chytilova´, 2010).They all tried to reduce this problem
by shortening the list of options, thereby making the measure less precise. Our approach
involved three consecutive choices between two options. Whereas for the ﬁrst choice the
two options were the same for all participants, the options for the second and third choices
were dependent on the previous choices made. Table 2 presents the sequence. In the ﬁrst
round, each participant was asked to choose between receiving 1,000TSH after one month
(option A) or 1,500 TSH after three months (option B). If the participant preferred option
A, we increased the amount of option B in the second round to 1,750 TSH. If, on the other
hand, the participant preferred option B, we reduced option B to 1,250 in the second round.
By adding a third conditional choice to the sequence, we cover a range of eight possible
intervals of corresponding to intervals of discount rates, as illustrated in Table 3.
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In our experiment, both payments were situated in the future.This was done tominimize
possible conﬂation with risk considerations (how can one be sure that the organizer keeps
his promise and will pay in the future). By situating both options in the future, such
considerations are assumed to be the same for each option. In the ﬁeld we ended up
cooperating with a local micro-ﬁnance bank.All payments were made in drawing rights on
the bank, cash-able from the particular date onward. More information on the experiment,
including a literal transcript of the experiment instructions, can be found in D’Exelle, Van
Campenhout and Lecoutere (2012b).
IV. Equity and efﬁciency in irrigation – stylized outcomes
We can derive outcomes for different scenarios. A ﬁrst scenario is one where all subjects
care for both aggregate efﬁciency and equality. This would result in the upstream user
sharing equally during the ﬁrst treatment and a rotation strategy for the remainder of the
experiment.3 This would mean that both the upstream and downstream user have equal
earnings, amounting to 325 TSH in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds. In the last ten rounds, each player
will receive ﬁve times 350 and ﬁve times 50. Each player would earn 3,625 TSH in this
scenario. In the aggregate, this wouldmean 565,500TSH,which is themaximum attainable
aggregate income in the game. Also in this case, the Gini coefﬁcient is zero.
A second stylized outcome is one inwhich the upstream users do not care about inequal-
ity in the outcome. In other words, U =0 in equation (2). In this setting, the upstream user
would always appropriate the total available number of hours, which is 12, thereby earning
500 TSH in the base period and 350 TSH in the scarcity treatment. His total earnings
would thus be 6,000 TSH, the result of (5×500+10×350). The downstream user would
always refrain from punishing, as this is costly. His return would thus be 750 TSH, the
result of (15×50). The aggregate income of this strategy combination would be 526,500
TSH, representing about 93% of the maximum attainable aggregate production. The Gini
index would be 0.39.
A third reference scenario we will use as a benchmark is one where players are not
interested in efﬁciency, but only care about equity. This scenario corresponds to a range
of situations where U is sufﬁciently large while at the same time patience is sufﬁ-
ciently low (or U is sufﬁciently high). In this scenario, we assume that the upstream user
always chooses the equal split, appropriating 6 hours of water and leaving the remaining
6 hours of water for the downstream user. In this scenario, the upstream and downstream
users have equal earnings, amounting to 325 TSH in the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds and 50 in the
remaining ten rounds. Hence, each player would earn 2,125 TSH in total. In this scenario,
aggregate earnings would amount to 331,500 for the entire experiment. This corresponds
to about 59% of maximized aggregate production. The Gini coefﬁcient here would also be
zero.
3
One may argue that it does not have to be rotation as such, but any strategy that results in equal cumulative
beneﬁts for both players over the entire game. For example, if the upstream user appropriates 12 hours during the ﬁrst
ﬁve rounds and then leaves all water ﬂowing to the downstream user, equity and efﬁciency would also be optimal
(assuming no discounting). However, in our experiment, participants did not know beforehand on how many rounds
would be played. In such circumstances, rotation would be the only equitable strategy.
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V. Descriptive statistics
Over all rounds, aggregate earnings amounted to 408,400 THS or 72% of maximum
aggregate production, but about 23% more than if everyone plays equal sharing all the
time. In other words, the average user earned about 500TSHmore than if equal split would
have prevailed all the time. However, the average player earned 1,000 TSH less than what
he or she could have earned if perfect rotation would have been played.The Gini coefﬁcient
is about 0.24.
Figure 1 shows the frequency distribution of hours appropriated by the upstream user.
In the ﬁrst panel, which pools data over all 15 rounds, we see that the dominant strategy is
the equal split. This is surprising, as the pure strategy Nash equilibrium is to appropriate
everything in each round.We attribute this to the prevailing norms of equal access to water.
If we only consider data from the scarcity treatment (second panel), the equal split remains
the dominant strategy, despite the substantial losses in efﬁciency this brings about. A
substantial amount of decisions now involve appropriating 7 hours ofwater,which results in
75TSHmore than the baseline revenue of 50TSH, but is sufﬁciently close to the equal split.
Figure 2 visualizes the evolution of hours appropriated by the upstream user over the
15 rounds for 16 randomly sampled individuals of the 78 upstream irrigation users we
subjected to the experiment. Several features spring to mind. First of all, none of the
participants play the optimal efﬁciency-equity trade-off strategy of appropriating 6 hours
during the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds and alternating between 0 and 12 hours over the remaining
rounds. Secondly, there are a substantial number of people that seem to prefer equity above
efﬁciency. While only four individuals consistently go for the equal split (e.g. individuals
seven and ten in Figure 2), 27%of the upstreamusers remain very close to it (e.g. individuals
11 and 43). Third, very few people in our sample choose strategies that result in efﬁcient
but unequal outcomes. For instance, nobody plays the Nash equilibrium of taking 12 hours
all the time. In fact, only three individuals always takemore than 6 hours.Themost extreme
case always takes 11 hours. Fourth, more than 60% of the sample in Figure 2 rotates at
least once, in that they cross the line of 6 hours. Finally, a substantial part of the data set
shows the typical zigzagging pattern of negative serial correlation. Loosely deﬁned, about
37 individuals show signs of such behaviour. Examples of such behaviour are individuals
9, 22, 66, 68 and 71.
Figure 1. Average distributions
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Figure 2. Random subset of upstream users decisions over rounds
VI. Econometric analysis
In this section,we empirically test the following two hypotheses. First, we verify if irrigators
adapt their strategy to the incentives provided by the scarcity treatment. Given the context of
strong equity norms and the equity–efﬁciency trade-off in the scarcity treatment, we expect
to see signiﬁcantly more rotation under scarcity. Second, we test if impatient irrigators, as
expressed by a higher discount rate, are less inclined to rotate.
To do so, we run a series of regressions that estimate the relationship between the
amount of water appropriated in a particular round r and the amount of water appropriated
in the previous round (r−1).Wewill be particularly interested in interactionswith the other
conditioning variables (an indicator for the treatment, an indicator of the downstream user’s
reaction and a measure of impatience respectively) that produce negative coefﬁcients, as
this suggests rotating behaviour. To see why, let ai,r represent the amount of water taken
by the upstream user i, centred around the equal split (in other words, we subtract six from
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the total hours appropriated by the upstream user) in round r. We then regress this on ai,r−1
and allow for individual speciﬁc unobserved heterogeneity (i):
ai,r =1ai,r−1 +i + "i,r. (21)
If we estimate this regression and ﬁnd a parameter estimate (1) that is negative, this
means that, on average, a positive deviation from equal split is followed by a negative
deviation from equal split and vice versa. Such negative serial auto-correlation would
suggest an inclination to rotate. At the extreme, with perfect rotation, we would ﬁnd a
parameter estimate equal to −1. Hence, our baseline regression model is given in equation
(21), and we will introduce interactions with ai,r−1 to answer the three questions raised
above.
To answer the ﬁrst question, we construct an indicator of the scarcity treatment (tr).
This variable takes the value of zero for the ﬁrst ﬁve rounds and becomes one thereafter.
We expect the coefﬁcient estimate (t) on the interaction of this treatment indicator with
the lagged dependent variable to be signiﬁcantly negative. We add a second indicator that
reﬂects expression of disagreement of the downstream user with the received share in
the previous round (di,r). While the reaction of the downstream user does not directly
feature in our theoretical model and hence is not central to our theory, we strongly felt that
omitting this variable from our empirical speciﬁcation could lead to biased estimates. In our
experimental setup, expressing disagreement was the only way in which the downstream
user could try to inﬂuence the distribution behaviour of the upstream user. We therefore
needed to exclude the possibility that our results are driven by assertive downstream users.
Finally, we also interact an indicator of impatience (p) with the centred hours appro-
priated in the previous period. Impatient individuals are likely to engage less in a rotation
strategy (p >0). We also add all possible interactions between these three variables. The
ﬁnal model will therefore become:
ai,r =1ai,r−1 +tai,r−1tr +dai,r−1di,r +pai,r−1pi
+tdai,r−1trdi,r +tpai,r−1trpi +tdpai,r−1trdi,rpi +i + "i,r. (22)
To estimate this dynamic panel data model, we use theArellano–Bond estimator (Arellano
and Bond, 1991).4 All regressions also include time dummies as well as irrigation site
dummies. Table 4 reports the results.
Our baseline model (1) is a simple auto-regressive panel data model of order one that
regresses current hours appropriated by the upstream user minus six on appropriation in
the previous period. We do not ﬁnd any statistically signiﬁcant relation. When we add an
interaction for the treatment [model (2)], we ﬁnd a positive and statistically signiﬁcant
baseline effect of 0.319. This suggests that a positive (negative) deviation from the equal
split is likely to be followed by another positive (negative) deviation from the equal split,
but this deviation reduces over time. For example, an upstream user who appropriates all
available water in the ﬁrst round will appropriate only about 8 hours of water in the second
4
Such models assume a continuous response variable. As our dependent variable is (a transformation of) hours
appropriated out of a maximum of 12, one may argue that a generalized linear model such as the (multinomial) probit
model would be more appropriate. To check if our results are robust to this criticism, we constructed an indicator
function that is one if our dependent variable switched sign between two consecutive rounds and zero otherwise and
ran probit regressions with the same explanatory variables as the ones used below. This analysis conﬁrmed the main
ﬁndings of this article.
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TABLE 4
The effect of scarcity and time preference on rotation
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
a(t−1) −0.037 0.319 0.381 0.437 0.554 0.621
(0.40) (3.26)*** (3.31)*** (3.72)*** (4.41)*** (2.67)***
a(t−1)×disagree −0.137 −0.215 −0.179
(0.83) (1.53) (1.21)
a(t−1)× impatient −0.329 −0.293 −0.014
(1.76)* (1.57) (0.97)
a(t−1)× treat −0.465 −0.654 −0.626 −0.905 −1.284
(3.93)*** (4.37)*** (4.03)*** (5.20)*** (4.16)***
a(t−1)× treat×disagree 0.350 0.574 1.253
(1.61) (2.15)** (2.69)***
a(t−1)× treat× impatient 0.411 0.575 0.044
(1.72)* (2.30)** (2.43)**
a(t−1)× treat×disagree× −0.388 −0.064
impatient (1.02) (2.17)**
N 988 988 982 975 971 971
Individuals 76 76 76 75 75 75
Number of instruments 26 26 39 39 61 61
Sargan test 36.75*** 7.20 17.53 31.11* 57.93** 62.25**
F-test rotation in treatment 1.96* 1.61 4.95** 5.58**
F-test rotation if impatient 0.19 1.16 2.42
Notes: t-statistics are in brackets, and based on standard errors that are consistent in the presence of any pattern of
heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation within panels. In model (5), patient is a binary indicator while in model (6),
patient is a continuous variable. *, ** and *** denotes signiﬁcance at 10, 5 and 1% respectively.
round (being the result of 0.319× 6= 1.914). What is more interesting is that we ﬁnd a
signiﬁcantly negative additional effect under the scarcity treatment that more than offsets
the baseline effect.A one sided F-test shows that the overall effect is signiﬁcantly different
from zero and negative. In other words, we can conﬁrm that, under the scarcity treatment,
there is a tendency to rotate, increasing efﬁciency while preserving equity.
Model (3) introduces the reaction of the downstream user into the model. It adds an
interaction between having disagreedwith the share left by the upstreamuser in the previous
round and the hours that were appropriated by the upstream user in the previous round. It
seems that expression of disagreement does not affect distribution behaviour. Model (4)
replaces the disagreement effect with the effect of impatience of the upstream user.5 In the
ﬁrst instance, the effect of impatience on the evolution of hours appropriated is estimated by
interacting a dummy variable taking the value of one if a player’s discount rate is larger than
17.26%. We ﬁnd a positive coefﬁcient in the scarcity treatment, indicating that irrigators
who are less patient are less inclined to follow a rotation strategy. At the bottom of the
table, we ran the F-test on the overall effect of the treatment again, which has lost its
signiﬁcance.We also add a second F-test that looks at the overall effect of being impatient.
5
The time preference included in the model is for the upstream user.We also ran regressions with additional effects
for the downstream user’s impatience. However, the results for the downstream user were not signiﬁcant, while the
results for the upstream user remained the same.The interaction between upstream and downstream user’s impatience
was also insigniﬁcant. This suggests that the time preference effect mainly works through the upstream user. This is
not surprising as he/she has control over the appropriation decision.
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The result suggests that there is no signiﬁcant effect of being impatient. This is according
to expectations, as we expect impatience only to become important when equity efﬁciency
dilemmas arise, which is in the scarcity treatment.
Model (5) captures both the upstream user’s time preference and the expression of dis-
agreement by the downstream user. As in the second model, there is a signiﬁcant rotation
effect in the scarcity treatment, strong enough to more than offset the overall positive auto-
correlation. However, both coefﬁcients for impatience and punishment are signiﬁcantly
positive, indicating that impatient upstream users, just as upstream users that were con-
fronted with disagreeing downstream users, are less likely to engage in rotation behaviour.
The effects are similar in magnitude and large enough to offset the incentive effect created
by the scarcity treatment.
Model (6) reﬁnes the time preference measure. Instead of using a simple binary vari-
able, we exploit the fact that our experiment produced eight intervals and interpret this as a
continuous variable directly measuring the upstream user’s discount rate.6 The results are
similar to the previous model, but the effects are even more outspoken. The result suggests
that a 1% increase in the discount rate of the upstream user increases current water appro-
priation by 4% of the amount appropriated in the previous round. The results also suggest
that the average upstream user will cease to rotate once his discount rate surpasses 22.1%,
ceteris paribus. Upstream users need to be sufﬁciently patient to bring about success-
ful rotation strategies.7 Disagreement by the downstream user is again reducing rotating
behaviour. The joint tests at the bottom of table 4 conﬁrm what we found earlier.
One may argue that the lack of rotation is due to heterogeneity in attitudes toward
risk, rather than time preference.Indeed, the fact that participants did not know in advance
how many rounds would be played may prompt more risk adverse individuals to refrain
from rotating. To test this hypothesis, we elicited attitudes toward risk of the individual
players using Binswanger’s (1980) behavioural experiment. 8 If we use this variable in the
regression instead of time preference, we ﬁnd that risk has no signiﬁcant effect on the
dynamics of distribution behaviour of the upstream user.This leads us to conclude that it
is not attitudes toward risk that drives our results.
Somewhat related to this argument, one may feel that the introduction of a threshold
after the ﬁfth round alters expectations with respect to the duration of the experiment,
6
We did this by taking the midpoints of the discount rate intervals in Table 3. For the ﬁrst and last interval, we used
2.23% and 22.2% respectively. However, we also ran the regression without the ﬁrst and last intervals, reducing the
sample size by about 300 observations. In addition, we also ran the regression with our impatience measure assumed
as continuous and taking simply the class numbers, ranging from 1 to 8. In all cases, regression results were similar
in terms of signs and signiﬁcance.
7
Even though this is an experiment, one may dispute whether we are identifying a direct causal effect. It is argued
that poverty may not be a consequence of impatience but a cause. It may be that a poor individual that is assigned
the role of upstream user has an inclination to appropriate less. If poverty causes impatience, this would result in
endogeneity bias. We tested for this in the following way. If the above would be the case, the inclusion of a measure
of poverty in the regression would most likely render impatience insigniﬁcant, as impatience would be little more
than a proxy for poverty. We experimented with the inclusion of some variables that indicated food insecurity over
the last year, but the effects remained robust.
8
Binswanger (1980) conducted experiments in India, asking individuals to choose to play one out of six gambles.
The outcome of each gamble was determined by tossing a coin and the amount was paid out immediately.The gambles
ranged from a safe amount of money (resulting from both heads and tails) to a 50% chance of a large gain and 50%
chance of no gain. The six alternatives are constructed in such a way that higher expected returns could only be
‘purchased’ at the cost of higher variance. Each alternative then corresponds to a risk aversion class.
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(a) (b)
Figure 3. Impulse response functions. (a) Agreement; (b) disagreement
leading to a change in the implicit discount rate applied to future rounds. While it is not
clear how the discount rate will change (the introduction of scarcity might have made
subjects believe that the ﬁctional resource was soon to run out, or it might have made
them believe that the game was only just getting started), we feel that the fact that risk
was not correlated to the treatment is reassuring. If expectations of the number of rounds
played would be an important variable, we would also expect that people with different
attitudes toward risk would react differently to a change in this variable brought about by
the treatment. In other words, if everyone all of a sudden thinks the change after the ﬁfth
round will mean the game has just begun, risk lovers would start to rotate, making risk
correlated to the treatment.
The estimates can be used to look at simple impulse response functions for different
scenarios (Figure 3). We only concentrate on the scarcity treatment here and assume that
the initial value is total appropriation by the upstream user. The ﬁrst panel shows how these
12 hours evolve through time for three types of upstream users with varying discount rates
(0%, 10% and 20%) and disagreement is not possible. For patient individuals, with low
discount rates, the impulse response function shows substantial rotation that persists for a
long period. For example, an upstream user with a 0% discount rate that appropriates 12
hours in round one will typically only take 2 hours in round two and let 10 hours ﬂow to the
downstream user. The rotation dampens as discount rates increase. However, when we also
incorporate the effect of disagreement (second panel), the dynamics change considerably.
A same patient user who appropriates 12 hours in the ﬁrst round will, when faced with
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disagreement, not rotate but appropriate only a bit less than 12 hours in the subsequent
round (8.4 hours). Disagreement seems to completely eliminate the propensity to rotate,
especially for the patient users.
In sum, we ﬁnd that irrigators do respond to the scarcity treatment in our behaviour.
That is, in the scarcity treatment, where we simulate an equity-efﬁciency tradeoff,
upstream users respond by appropriating more than the equal share in one round and
leaving more than the equal share to the downstream user in the subsequent round. We
also ﬁnd that if the downstream user expresses disagreement over the share received,
the upstream user is unlikely to start rotating resource shares.In the scarcity treatment,
we ﬁnd that the upstream user will actually appropriate more if the downstream user
disagrees. We also conﬁrm the prediction from our theoretical model that impatient ir-
rigators, as expressed by a higher discount rate, are less inclined to come to a rotation
strategy.
VII. Conclusion and policy implications
We study a situation where a common pool resource is shared within a community charac-
terized by strong egalitarian norms.We argue that, in the casewhere there is a direct conﬂict
between equity and efﬁciency,these norms may lead to large aggregate welfare losses. We
then point out that repeated interaction is able to reconcile equity and efﬁciency when the
players take a sufﬁciently long run perspective. We develop a simple model that features
such an equity-efﬁciency trade-off and test its predictions using data from an irrigation
experiment.
We ﬁnd that irrigators from the Southern Highlands in Tanzania strongly believe in
equity. If we introduce increasing returns to the resource that has to be divided by the
upstream user, such that it is most efﬁcient to allocate all resources to one player, we ﬁnd
that irrigators start to rotate, effectively resolving the equity-efﬁciency conﬂict. However,
the downstream user is able to break this equilibrium by disagreeing on the distribution.
In addition, just as disagreeing reduces the tendency to rotate, impatience is also counter-
productive.
Indigenous institutions that rely on rotation strategies to overcome equity-efﬁciency
tradeoffs are not all that uncommon in small-scale societies. An example of a successful
local institution that relies on such mechanism are ‘rotating savings and credit associa-
tions’(ROSCAs), where, in repeated occasions a group of people collect ﬁnancial resources
to lend to one of the group members. An important rationale for the existence of such
associations is that with limited access to credit markets, a ROSCA makes it possible to
fund lumpy investment expenditures that often function as barriers to entry into an activity
(Besley, Coate and Loury, 1993; Handa and Kirton, 1999). Within the group, the savings
may be seen as a common pool resource that needs to be distributed equally, but also in a
way that potential for increasing returns can be exploited.
Finally, our research shows that equity-efﬁciency conﬂicts can only be resolved when
agents focus on longer termwelfare maximization.Therefore, policymakers should be con-
cerned about issues that are likely to affect time preference (Becker and Mulligan, 1997).
For instance, economic shocks,which force people to dealwith acute needs,may jeopardize
the sustainability of rotation institutions. Policymakers could be helpful in reducing the
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impact of economic shocks by offering insurance or consumption credit services, among
others.
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